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Introduction
It was once widely agreed that knowledge is justified true belief. Enter Gettier
[1963] who adduced two cases that showed, to the satisfaction of nearly all re-
searchers in the field, that one can have a justified true belief and yet fail to know.
Since then, fixing the problem with the ‘JTB account’ that Gettier identified has
been one of the main points on the epistemological agenda. Unfortunately, this
task has proved to be rather difficult. While the literature features a whole host
of proposals for such fixes, there is an equally impressive number of Gettier-style
cases that show that these fixes meet with the same fate as the original JTB account.
In fact, it is fair to say that 50 years of research have not produced an account of
knowledge that is even widely agreed among researchers in the field.
That said, there are a number of live proposals in the literature. One of the most
popular ones is virtue epistemology, which aims to offer accounts of knowledge
and/or justified belief in terms of epistemic abilities.1 On the other hand, some
researchers take the continued failure of attempts to fix the JTB account to suggest
that the JTB account is irredeemably flawed and have scrapped this point from
their agendas. Instead, many of them have adopted a ‘knowledge first’ approach
to epistemology, which aims to explain various core phenomena in epistemology
in terms of knowledge.2 This paper connects these two developments in episte-
mology. Its core aims are (i) to develop knowledge first virtue epistemological
accounts of knowledge and justified belief and (ii) to show that these accounts
compare favourably with their traditionalist cousins.3
In order to achieve this aim, I will first introduce virtue epistemology (VE) in
its traditional guise and sketch an argument that VE does not succeed in offering
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1 Champions of virtue epistemology include John Greco [e.g. 2010], Alan Millar [e.g. 2010],
Duncan Pritchard [e.g. 2012], Wayne Riggs [e.g. 2002], Ernest Sosa [e.g. 2015], John Turri [e.g.
2011] and Linda Zagzebski [e.g. 1996].
2 Champions of knowledge first epistemology include Alexander Bird [2007], Clayton Little-
john [e.g. 2013], Alan Millar [e.g. 2010], Jonathan Sutton [e.g. 2007] and, most famously, Timothy
Williamson [e.g. 2000].
3 See [Kelp and Ghijsen 2015, Kelp 2015c] for arguments that knowledge first virtue episte-
mology compares favourably with alternative knowledge first accounts of justified belief.
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a fully satisfactory solution to the Gettier problem (§1). The main part of the
paper will be concerned with developing the alternative knowledge first version
of virtue epistemology. §2 introduces knowledge first epistemology and describes
the general project. In §3 I will give a general account of the normativity of a
certain species of performances, which I will then (§4) apply to beliefs as epistemic
performances, thus arriving at my knowledge first virtue epistemological accounts
of knowledge and justified belief. §5 argues that these accounts can offer a more
satisfactory solution to the Gettier problem than its traditionalist rivals.
1 Virtue Epistemology
1.1 VE’s Accounts of Justified Belief and Knowledge
The kind of VE I am interested in has most prominently been championed by
Ernest Sosa [e.g. 2015] and John Greco [e.g. 2010]. It starts with a general ac-
count of performance normativity according to which performances with a goal
can be assessed along the following three dimensions: success, competence and
aptness. The idea is that a performance is successful if and only if it reaches its
goal, competent if and only if it is produced by the exercise of an ability to reach
the goal, and apt if and only it is successful because competent.
It may be worth noting that this account of performance normativity leaves at
least a number of key notions undefined. It does not tell us what it takes to possess
an ability, what it takes to exercise it and what it takes for a success to be because
of the exercise of an ability. Different champions of VE have offered different
accounts of these key notions4, thus arriving at different versions of VE.
While there are disagreements between champions of VE, there are also a num-
ber of points that are widely agreed on by virtue epistemologists. First, they all take
belief to be a kind of performance with a goal.5 As a result, the normative frame-
work for performances can be applied directly to belief and yields an account of
the normativity of belief. Second, virtue epistemologists have tended to take belief
as type of epistemic performance that has truth as its aim. This gives us:
Successful Belief. A belief is successful if and only if true.
4 For instance, Sosa and Turri unpack the because relation in terms of the manifestation of an
ability, whereas Greco and Pritchard opt for an explanatory salience alternative, and Riggs and
Zagzebski seem attracted to a primitive account. Millar takes the notion of exercise of an ability
to be a success notion, in the sense that one cannot exercise an ability to φ unless one φs. In
contrast, most other virtue epistemologists allow for unsuccessful exercises of abilities. There are
also differences in just how abilities depend on conditions. Millar and Greco take abilities to be
very strongly dependent on conditions in the sense that in sufficiently unfavourable conditions the
ability is unavailable to the agent altogether. In contrast, most other virtue epistemologists opt for
a slightly weaker version according to which the abilities are relative to conditions but abilities
remain available to agents in even in fairly unfavourable conditions.
5 For a recent criticism of this idea see [Chrisman 2012], for responses see [Sosa 2015,
Broncano-Berrocal 2015].
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Competent Belief. A belief is competent if and only if it is produced by an exer-
cise of an ability to form true beliefs.
Apt Belief. A belief is apt if and only if it is true because competent.
Next, champions of VE identify knowledge and justified belief with different
normative standings of beliefs as performances:
VE-JB. One justifiably believes that p if and only if competently believes that p.
VE-K. One knows that p if and only if one aptly believes that p.
VE carries a significant amount of promise. Besides offering an appealing
account of the normativity of belief as well as nicely motivated accounts of knowl-
edge and justified belief, the view promises to solve a number of venerable epis-
temological problems, including the value problem6 and, most importantly for
present purposes, the notorious Gettier problem.
1.2 The Gettier Problem
To get a grip on the Gettier problem, consider first a run-of-the-mill Gettier case:
Stopped Clock. Having come down the stairs, Mr. White looks at the grandfather clock
in the hallway, sees that it reads 8:22 and on that basis comes to believe that it is
8:22. The clock has an outstanding track-record of functioning properly and Mr.
White has no reason to think that it is currently not accurate. His belief is true. It
is in fact 8:22. Unbeknownst to Mr. White, however, the clock has stopped exactly
twelve hours ago.
Intuitively, Mr. White’s belief that it is 8:22 is both justified and true but does not
qualify as knowledge. Cases like this one thus serve to show that justified true
belief is not sufficient for knowledge. They also raise the question as to what
condition must be satisfied in addition to justified true belief in order to get knowl-
edge. The Gettier problem is the problem of providing a satisfactory answer to this
question.
Here is an appealing diagnosis of why agents in Gettier cases fall short of
knowledge: it is pure luck that they end up with a true belief [e.g. Pritchard 2005].
More specifically, their beliefs are afflicted by a stroke of bad epistemic luck that
puts them at great risk of acquiring a false belief. However, thanks to an addi-
tional stroke of good epistemic luck, the agent ends up with a true belief after all
[Zagzebski 1994]. In Stopped Clock, the stroke of bad epistemic luck consists in
the fact that the clock Mr. White takes a reading from is stopped. The stroke of
good epistemic luck is that the clock stopped exactly twelve hours earlier, thus
displaying the time correctly.
6 Very roughly, the value problem is the problem of explaining just how knowledge is more
valuable than mere true belief or perhaps belief that falls short of knowledge. For more on the
value problem see [Kvanvig 2003, Pritchard 2007]. For virtue epistemological approaches to the
value problem see e.g. [Riggs 2002, Greco 2010, Sosa 2015].
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This diagnosis of Gettier cases motivates a constraint on solutions to the Gettier
problem. Any condition that, in conjunction with justified true belief, is said to be
sufficient for knowledge must rule out the kind of luck at issue in Gettier cases.
With these points in play, we can now see why VE may, at first glance, ap-
pear to be particularly well positioned to solve the Gettier problem. According to
VE, justified true belief is competent and successful belief, whereas knowledge is
apt belief. But now recall that, in addition to competence and success, apt belief
requires that the belief to be successful because competent. The reason why VE
carries so much promise to solve the Gettier problem is that there is independent
reason to believe that apt belief, i.e. belief that is successful because competent, is
incompatible with the kind of luck at issue in Gettier cases.
How so? The answer is that there is independent reason to think that apt per-
formance in general is incompatible with the kind of luck at issue in Gettier cases.
To see this consider the following non-epistemic analogue of a Gettier case:
Diverted Arrow. Mr. Blonde, a highly competent archer, fires a competent shot at the
target before him. On its way to the target the arrow is brought off its trajectory by
a gust of wind. However, a moment later, a second gust of wind brings the arrow
back on target with the result that it hits the bulls-eye.
In this case, Mr. Blonde’s shot is both successful and competent. However, it is
intuitively clear that it is not successful because competent and thus not apt.
Notice also just how appealing the parallel diagnosis is: the reason why Mr.
Blonde’s shot is not apt is that it is a matter pure luck that it hits the target. More-
over, we also find the familiar combination of a stroke of good luck and a stroke of
bad luck. In Diverted Arrow, the stroke of bad luck consists in the arrow’s being
brought off target by a gust of wind. Mr. Blonde’s shot is running a serious risk of
missing the target. However, this risk is prevented from materialising by a stroke
of good luck, which here takes the form of a second gust of wind that brings the
arrow back on target.
It comes to light that there are non-epistemic analogues of Gettier cases in
which the agents’ performances are successful and competent but not apt. What’s
more, these non-epistemic analogues exhibit exactly the combination of two strokes
of luck that are widely agreed to be the driving force in Gettier cases. Given that
this is so, it may now seem that VE has what it takes to offer a successful so-
lution to the Gettier problem. After all, champions of VE may now claim that
Gettier cases are simply an instantiation of a more general phenomenon. Since it
is independently plausible that such cases in general involve performances that are
successful and competent but not apt, there is reason to believe that the same will
hold true for its epistemic instantiations, belief. And since VE identifies knowl-
edge with apt belief, there is independent reason to believe that beliefs in Gettier
cases fall short of knowledge.
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1.3 Fake Barn Cases
Unfortunately, there is a fly in the ointment. There is a second kind of Gettier case,
besides the one exemplified by Stopped Clock. The most famous example was first
stated by Goldman in 19767:
Fake Barns. Mr. Pink is driving through the countryside and is currently looking out of
the window of his car. He sees what appears to be a barn in the field and forms a
perceptual belief that there is a barn in the field. Unbeknownst to Mr. Pink, he is
looking at one of the few real barns in an area peppered with barn façades that are
so cleverly constructed as to be indistinguishable from real barns from Mr. Pink’s
position on the road.
Just as in Stopped Clock before, the agent’s (here: Mr. Pink’s) belief is justified and
true but falls short of knowledge. What’s more, the same diagnosis as in Stopped
Clock is plausible here: it is a matter of pure luck that Mr. Pink arrives at a true
belief. In particular, Mr. Pink suffers from a stroke of bad luck in that he is in a
part of the world in which fake barns prevail. This stroke of bad luck is cancelled
out by a stroke of good luck: he is looking at one of the few real barns in the area.
The difficulty with Fake Barns is that VE cannot plausibly explain Mr. Pink’s
lack of knowledge in the same way as in Stopped Clock. The reason for this is
that there are non-epistemic analogues of Fake Barns in which the agents’ perfor-
mances are very plausibly apt. Consider the following case by Pritchard [2008]:
Sabotaged Range. Mr. Orange, a skilled archer, is taking a shot a target at his shooting
range. Unbeknownst to him, nearly all targets at the range are sabotaged to prevent
any shot fired at them. The target he is shooting at is the only non-sabotaged target
at the range.
It is intuitively clear that Mr. Orange’s shot is not only successful and competent
but also successful because competent and hence apt. If so, champions of VE
cannot treat cases like Fake Barns as just another instantiation of a general phe-
nomenon. VE’s attractive account of standard Gettier cases does not extend to fake
barn cases.
In fact, things are worse than this. It seems that the vast majority of non-
epistemic analogues of Fake Barns are cases in which the agent attains aptness.
Besides Sabotaged Range, think of a chef who successfully prepares a tasty omelette
but happened to take the only salt shaker in which the salt wasn’t replaced by sugar;
or think of an artist who successfully produces a beautiful monochrome after hav-
ing taken the only can in which the colour wasn’t replaced by acid. In all of these
cases, the agents’ performances are intuitively apt. If so, the pressure on champi-
ons of VE to acknowledge that the Mr. Pink’s belief in Fake Barns is apt also.
Fake barn cases constitute a significant obstacle for VE. Champions of VE
must explain the absence of knowledge in such cases. As a first observation, note
7 It may be worth noting that Goldman attributes this example to Carl Ginet. While Ginet does
describe the case in print, to the best of my knowledge he doesn’t do so before his 1988 paper.
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that most virtue epistemologists aim to offer a separate account for fake barn cases,
i.e. one that diverges from the account they give for standard Gettier cases such as
Stopped Clock. I’d like to point out that already the fact that fake barn cases are
given a separate treatment constitutes a potential cost for VE. It will do so if there
is an alternative account that offers a unified explanation of both standard Gettier
cases and fake barn cases. After all, such an account will have the theoretical
advantage of being simpler.8
What’s worse, there is reason to believe that extant virtue epistemological ac-
counts of Fake Barns remain ultimately unsuccessful. To see this, note first that
these accounts venture to deal with fake barn cases by introducing a modal condi-
tion into the account of knowledge in one way or another.9 The problem now is
that these modal conditions are too strong to accommodate intuitions of presence
of knowledge in other cases. My own favourite argument to this effect involves
epistemic Frankfurt cases, which are inspired by Frankfurt’s famous 1969 cases.10
8 One might worry that this argument begs the question against VE. After all, champions of
VE often argue that fake barn cases are structurally importantly different from standard Gettier
cases. If so, by the lights of champions of VE, it may seem to make perfect sense to give them
a separate treatment. I have two points to make by way of response. First, the question remains
as to whether this structural difference cuts at the epistemological joints. If the reason these cases
are taken to be different is simply that VE’s treatment of Gettier cases doesn’t extend to fake barn
cases, the above complaint can hardly be said to beg the question against the view. (Compare: a
champion of a ‘no false lemma’ (NFL) account claims that there are important structural differences
between inferential and non-inferential standard Gettier cases and that, as a result, non-inferential
Gettier cases afford separate treatment. If the reason for this claim is simply that the NFL account
doesn’t extend to non-inferential Gettier cases, this will do little to defuse a complaint of the kind
made above.) Second, and more importantly, I don’t take the above considerations to constitute an
argument against VE, at least not by themselves. Rather, the thought is that if, in addition, there is
an alternative view that can offer a uniform account and if all else is equal between the alternative
account and VE, then there is some reason to think (i) that the alternative view is preferable and
(ii) that the structural difference in question does not cut at the epistemological joints. (Compare:
there is an alternative to the NFL account (perhaps a version of VE) such that it offers a uniform
treatment of inferential and non-inferential Gettier cases and all else is equal between it and the
NFL account. If so, (i) the alternative account is preferable to the NFL account and (ii) there is
reason to think that the difference between inferential and non-inferential Gettier cases does not
cut at the epistemological joints.) While I will develop just such an account in what follows, I will
do so only in §4. As a result, the above argument is presently still awaiting completion.
9 For instance, Pritchard [2012] adds a safety condition on knowledge to deal with fake barn
cases. Greco [2010] uses a modal condition on abilities (which in essence is a safety condition)
to deal with fake barn cases. Sosa [Sosa 2015] uses a distinction between animal and reflective
knowledge and argues for a modal condition (again, in essence a safety condition) on reflective
knowledge.
10 Note, however, that Frankfurt cases are not essential to the argument. Any case in which the
agent knows but doesn’t satisfy the proposed modal conditions on knowledge will do. Since these
conditions all amount to something like a safety condition (see fn.9), cases of unsafe knowledge
are a good candidates for doing the work that I take Frankfurt cases to do. Crucially, the literature
features a wide variety of such cases [e.g. Baumann 2008, Bogardus 2013, Comesaña 2005, Neta
and Rohrbaugh 2004]. As a result, the argument may be successful even if Frankfurt cases even-
tually fail to do the trick (e.g. because they don’t generate the required intuition of knowledge in
readers). Finally, suppose that there is no one case that works against all of the proposed modal
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Here is one example:
Frankfurt Clock. Mr. Blue’s arch-nemesis, a powerful demon, has an interest that Mr.
Blue forms a belief that it’s 8:22 by looking at the grandfather clock in the hallway
when he comes down the stairs. In order to achieve this, Mr. Blue’s arch-nemesis is
prepared to set the clock to 8:22 when Mr. Blue comes down the stairs. However,
Mr. Blue’s arch-nemesis is also lazy. He will act only if Mr. Blue does not come
down the stairs at 8:22 of his own accord. Suppose, as it so happens, Mr. Blue does
come down the stairs at 8:22. Mr. Blue’s arch-nemesis remains inactive. Mr. Blue
forms a belief that it’s 8:22. It is 8:22. The grandfather clock is working reliably as
always [Kelp 2009, 2015a].
Intuitively, Mr. Blue knows that it is 8:22 in this case. After all, we may assume,
he has the ability to read the clock and forms a belief via an exercise of this ability.
Moreover, the clock is actually functioning properly and the reading is accurate.
Recall that I pointed out that extant virtue epistemological accounts of knowl-
edge introduce a modal condition to explain the absence of knowledge in fake barn
cases. The problem they are now facing is that agents in epistemic Frankfurt cases,
such as Mr. Blue above, will not satisfy any modal condition on knowledge that
serves to explain the absence of knowledge in fake barn cases. The reason for this
is that fake barn cases and epistemic Frankfurt cases have exactly the same modal
profile. Any modal condition on knowledge that successfully predicts absence of
knowledge in fake barn cases will also predict absence of knowledge in Frankfurt
cases. Correlatively, any modal condition on knowledge that allows for knowl-
edge in Frankfurt cases will not be able to explain the absence of knowledge in
fake barn cases. In any case, accounts of knowledge that venture to accommodate
the intuition of absence of knowledge in fake barn cases by means of a modal con-
dition are in trouble. That’s why extant virtue epistemological accounts of fake
barn cases remain unsatisfactory.11
2 Knowledge First Epistemology
While, at first glance, VE appeared to offer promising accounts of justified belief
and knowledge, it turns out that VE continues to struggle with the Gettier problem.
In what follows, I would like to develop a version of VE that avoids this difficulty.
It differs from standard versions of the view in that it takes beliefs to be perfor-
mance that aim not at truth but at knowledge. Accordingly, it takes the epistemic
abilities required for knowledge and justified belief to be abilities to know.
It is easy to see that this version of VE will not yield a so-called ‘reductive
analysis’ of knowledge. That is to say, it does not provide an analysis of knowl-
edge in terms of a non-circular set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions. Even so, the argument may be successful provided that as there is at least one case that
can be put to work against each of them.
11 [Kelp 2015a] provides a more in-depth presentation of this argument. There I also argue in
some detail the most prominent virtue theoretic accounts of knowledge in the literature, including
Greco’s and Sosa’s, all succumb to this problem.
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conditions for knowledge. After all, if the epistemic abilities required for knowl-
edge are abilities to know, any account of knowledge in terms of epistemic abilities
so understood will violate the non-circularity constraint.
I am not the first to abandon the ambition of offering a reductive analysis of
knowledge. Others have taken the persistent failure of proposals in recent literature
as a reason to do so as well. The perhaps most prominent alternative to the ‘tra-
ditional analytical project’ is knowledge first epistemology. Its founder, Timothy
Williamson, characterises the view in the following passage:
“Knowledge first” is a slogan for epistemology that takes the distinction be-
tween knowledge and ignorance as the starting point from which to explain
other cognitive matters [W1]. It reverses the direction dominant in much
twentieth-century epistemology, which treated belief as explanatorily prior
to knowledge, attempting to analyze knowledge as belief that meets further
conditions, such as truth and justification [W2]. By contrast, a knowledge
first epistemologist might treat believing something as treating it as if one
knew it [W3].
[Williamson 2010: 208]
This characterisation of knowledge first epistemology contains three claims, which
I have labeled W1, W2 and W3, respectively. Williamson’s characterisation al-
ready indicates just how ambitious his project is. In fact, it exceeds the boundaries
of epistemology, at least as it is traditionally understood. By way of evidence, no-
tice that W1 takes knowledge to be the starting point from which to explain other
cognitive matters. Moreover, W3 anticipates one of Williamson’s famous theses,
to wit, that knowledge is a mental state in its own right and that belief is to be
analysed in terms of knowledge. Since accounts of mental states are traditionally
taken to fall within the domain of the philosophy of mind and perhaps philosoph-
ical psychology, Williamson anticipates that he will go beyond the boundaries of
epistemology as it is traditionally understood.
I’d like to flag that I will not follow Williamson in his pursuit of this ambitious
project. The reason for this is that I am interested developing a viable virtue episte-
mology, one that is better than its traditionalist cousins. Since, for this purpose, the
question as to whether knowledge is a state of mind in its own right is by-the-by,
Williamson’s thesis concerning the philosophy of mind can safely be put to one
side.12
12 At the same time, knowledge first virtue epistemology is compatible with Williamson’s thesis
that knowledge is a state of mind (henceforth also ‘KSM’). In fact, I recently discovered that Lisa
Miracchi [2014] has developed a knowledge first virtue epistemology in which KSM takes centre
stage. Like Miracchi’s, the account I develop below is compatible with KSM. However, my account
neither entails KSM, nor does KSM play a key role in it. I take this to be a benefit of my account.
After all, KSM remains a highly controversial thesis in the philosophy of mind. For that reason,
it will be of some interest if it is possible to reap at least some of the epistemological benefits of
knowledge first epistemology, without taking on the heavyweight commitments in the philosophy
of mind that KSM brings with it. I’d also like to emphasise that I have developed my own version
of knowledge first virtue epistemology independently of Miracchi’s.
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At this stage one might naturally ask the following question: In what sense
exactly is my account going to be knowledge first epistemological? The answer is
that I do adopt the core epistemological claim of Williamson’s characterisation of
knowledge first epistemology, that is, the following version of W2:
Knowledge First Epistemology (KF). Knowledge first epistemology reverses the tradi-
tional direction of analysis in epistemology: rather than analysing knowledge in
terms of justified belief, justified belief is analysed in terms of knowledge. In
other words, rather than treating justified belief as explanatorily prior to knowledge,
knowledge is taken to have explanatory priority over justified belief.
I submit that KF retains enough of the spirit of Williamson’s project to qualify as a
knowledge first view. Since it reverses the direction of analysis, it is incompatible
with the traditional analytical project. Since it takes knowledge to enjoy explana-
tory priority over justified belief, there is an important respect in which knowledge
comes first. For that reason, a virtue epistemology that satisfies KF can plausibly
be regarded as a knowledge first virtue epistemology (KFVE). It is exactly this
view that I will develop in more detail in the next sections.13
3 Simple Goal-Directed Practices
3.1 A Basic Framework
Let’s start with a framework for simple goal-directed practices (SGPs). For a prac-
tice to be goal-directed is for it to have a success condition, a condition under
which the practice’s goal is attained. One very simple kind of goal-directed prac-
tice involves two types of particular, targets and moves, and a designated relation.
The success condition of this kind of practice can be defined as obtaining if and
only if a move stands in the designated relation to the target. In (a very simple
version of) target archery, call it ‘ARCH’, the target is a disc with a set surface
area, moves are shots taken from a set distance, and the designated relation is the
hit relation. A success in ARCH is a shot that hits the target.
Practitioners of SGPs are move-producers. They may attain success in a given
SGP. They do so if and only if they produce a move that stands in the designated
relation to the target. Practitioners of ARCH are shot-producers. A practitioner of
ARCH attains a success in ARCH if and only if he produces a shot that hits the
target.
13 Or, to be more precise, I will develop a knowledge first virtue epistemological account of
basic first-order knowledge and justified belief. That is to say, I want to set aside the issues
of second-order knowledge/justified belief as well as of non-basic knowledge/justified belief, i.e.
knowledge/justified belief which depends for its status as knowledge/justified belief on the epis-
temic status of other beliefs. My main reason for this is to keep the complexity of the paper
manageable.
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3.2 Abilities
Practitioners of SGPs may have the ability to attain success in a given SGP. You,
the reigning world champion in ARCH, have the ability to hit the target, while I,
a blind man, don’t. Let’s take a closer look at these abilities (henceforth ‘SGP
abilities’).
SGP abilities involve ways of move production. Your ability to hit the target
involves a way of shooting. More than one way of move production may be avail-
able to any one agent. For instance, you may shoot with your right hand or with
your left hand. Of course, not all ways of move production will qualify as SGP
abilities. While you may have the ability to hit the target in ARCH when shooting
with your right hand, you may not have this ability when shooting with your left.
SGP abilities are relative to conditions. You may have the ability to hit the tar-
get in ARCH when shooting with your left when sufficiently concentrated, sober,
not being shoved while releasing the arrow, when shooting in normal winds, when
there are no jokesters destroying the target at the last second and so on. The con-
ditions relative to which one may have an SGP ability may differ across differ-
ent ways of move production. While you may have the ability to hit the target
in ARCH when shooting with your left hand but only when you are completely
sober, you may have this ability when shooting with your right even after a couple
of beers.
SGP abilities involve dispositions to attain success. Dispositions are associated
with (i) trigger (T ) and (ii) manifestation (M ) conditions. In the case of SGP
abilities, the manifestations are, of course, attainments of success. In addition, the
trigger conditions are uses of ways of move production. Furthermore, dispositions
are (iii) relative to conditions (C ). In the case of SGP abilities these conditions
are the ones to which the relevant ability is relative. To possess an ability to attain
success in a given SGP, S, relative to conditions C, a practitioner must have a way
of move production, W , such that he is disposed to attain S’s success (M ) when
using W (T ) in C (C ). For instance, to have the ability to hit the target in ARCH
relative to C you must have a way of shooting such that you are disposed to hit
the target when using it in C. Finally, (iv) dispositions are widely regarded to be
associated with counterfactual conditionals of the form were T to obtain in C ,
the possessor of the disposition would exhibitM . This means that practitioners of
SGPs who have an ability to attain success in a given SGP, S, relative to conditions
C will be such that were they to use the way of move production at issue in this
ability (T ) in C (C ), they would attain S’s success (M ). Those who have the
ability to hit the target in ARCH relative to C will be such that were they to use the
way of shooting at issue in this ability in C, they would hit the target.14
14 Properties (i), (ii) and (iv) above are among what Jennifer McKitrick [2003: 157] calls “mark-
ers of dispositionality”, that is properties of dispositions that are widely agreed upon among con-
tributors to the debate on dispositions. For what I take to be convincing motivations of property
(iii) see e.g. [Mumford 1998, Sosa 2015]. Finally, it might be better to construe dispositions as be-
ing associated with a probability of manifestation conditional on triggering in suitable conditions,
rather than with the counterfactual conditionals at issue in (iv) above. One advantage that this kind
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A way of move production that qualifies as an ability to attain success in one
SGP may or may not so qualify for another SGP. Consider another SGP, ARCH’.
ARCH’ is just like ARCH except that the target has a different shape than the
target in ARCH. Instead of being disc-shaped, it is star-shaped. It may be that,
in a certain set of conditions, C, a way of move production—shooting with your
left hand, say—disposes you to hit the target in ARCH but not ARCH’. Your left-
handed way of move production qualifies as an ability to hit the target in C relative
to ARCH but not ARCH’. You are not that good an archer when shooting with
your left hand. At the same time, it may also happen that a(nother) way of move
production qualifies as an ability to hit the target in C for both ARCH and ARCH’.
It may be that, in C, shooting with your right hand disposes you to hit the target
not only in ARCH but also in ARCH’. Your right-handed way of move production
qualifies as an ability to hit the target in C relative to ARCH and ARCH’. You are
that good an archer when shooting with your right hand.
For that reason a way of move production may also qualify as an ability to
attain success across a range of SGPs. A way of move production qualifies as an
ability to attain success across a given range, R, of SGPs only if it disposes one to
attain success when used for all SGPs in R. Your right-handed way of move pro-
duction may constitute an ability to hit the target across ARCH, ARCH’, ARCH”
(square-shaped), etc. Your left-handed way of move production may constitute an
ability to hit the target across ARCH, ARCH” but not ARCH’, etc.
With these points in play, I would like to propose the following account of SGP
abilities:
SGP Ability. One has an ability to attain success in a range, R, of SGPs and relative to
conditions, C, if and only if one has a way of move production, W , such that, for
any S ∈ R, using W in C disposes one to attain success in S.15
3.3 Exercises of Abilities
I want to suggest that exercises of SGP abilities are uses of ways of move produc-
tion involved in SGP abilities. Or, more precisely,
SGP Exercise. One exercises an ability, A, to attain success for a range, R, of
SGPs and relative to conditions, C, if and only if one has A and produces a
move via the way of move production at issue in A.
of account of dispositions has for the application to abilities is that it can easily make sense of the
fallibility of abilities, even in favourable conditions. After all, the relevant probability of manifes-
tation may but need not be 1, even when the triggering conditions obtain in favourable conditions.
See e.g. [Healey 1991, Suarez 2007] for more on probabilistic approaches to dispositions.
15 See [Kelp 2015b] for a more detailed account on SGP Abilities (as well as SGP Exercise and
Competent SGP Move below). Note also that the full account of SGP abilities additionally features
what I call a groundedness condition on abilities, which is a generalisation of Millikan’s [2000:
ch. 4] idea that genuine abilities are distinguished from mere behavioural dispositions by being
relative to conditions in which they were acquired via learning or natural selection. That said, the
grounding condition does no substantive theoretical work in this paper. Accordingly, for present
purposes at least, it can safely be set aside.
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It is important to note that placing the agent in conditions relative to which he
does not have an SGP ability can have different effects on an agent’s performances.
Some such conditions will result in preventing an agent from using his way of
move production. For instance, being too drunk, distracted, nervous, shoved while
releasing the arrow and so on will prevent you from using the way of shooting
that qualifies as an SGP ability relative to some (albeit different) conditions. I
will henceforth refer to conditions that, when not satisfied, prevent the agent from
using his way of move production as conditions of shape (SH). According to SGP
Exercise, then, exercising an SGP ability requires that SH be satisfied.
In contrast, other such conditions do not prevent the agent from using his way
of move production when not satisfied and so allow him to exercise his ability
anyway. Suppose, for instance, that you fire a shot that would have hit the target
had it not been for a jokester who destroys the target when the arrow is about to hit
it. Even though your shot misses the target, you do get to produce a move via the
way of shooting that qualifies as an SGP ability relative to some (albeit different)
conditions. I will henceforth refer to conditions that, when not satisfied, do not
prevent the agent from using his way of move production as situational conditions
(SI). According to SGP Exercise exercising an SGP ability does not require that
SI be satisfied.
3.4 Competent Moves
Competent moves in an SGP require the exercise of an SGP ability. When pro-
ducing a shot in ARCH, your shot will be competent only if it is produced by an
ability to hit the target.
However, a competent move requires more than the exercise of an SGP ability.
To see this, let’s return to the case in which you are the reigning world champion
of ARCH. Suppose that you are currently engaging in ARCHX in which the target
changes its position discontinuously, randomly, and rapidly. Let’s assume, as is
plausible anyway, that you do not have the ability to hit the target in ARCHX .
You have no way of shooting that disposes you to produce successful moves in
ARCHX , no matter what conditions we may place you in. Suppose you take a shot
using a way of move production that disposes you to hit the target in a range R of
SGPs and relative to conditions C. Here you exercise your SGP ability to hit targets
in range R and relative to C. However, that does not make your shot competent.
The ability you exercise is the wrong ability for the SGP you are engaging in.
(An even clearer example may be the following: Suppose you have a way W of
producing layups in basketball that qualifies as an ability to score relative to some
C. Currently you are standing at the three-point line and have two seconds to score
a basket to win the game. Suppose you produce a shot via W , which, of course,
doesn’t even get close to the basket. On the present view, you exercise an ability
to score. However, your shot is not competent. Again, the reason for this is that
you are exercising the wrong ability to score here.) For a move to be competent,
then, it must be a move in an SGP, S, that is within the range R for which your
way of move production qualifies as an ability. Contrast the situation described
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above with one in which you engage in an SGP that, we may assume, is within the
range, R, of your SGP ability, but in which a jokester prevents the shot from being
successful. Here you not only exercise an ability to hit the target, your shot is also
competent.
There is thus reason to believe that, in order to produce a competent move in a
given SGP, the SGP must be within the range (of SGPs) of the SGP ability exer-
cised. The above considerations thus motivate the following account of competent
moves:
Competent SGP Moves. A move in a given SGP, S, is competent if and only if it
is produced by an exercise of an SGP ability to attain success in a range, R,
of SGPs and relative to conditions, C, such that S ∈ R.
This gives us a detailed account of what competence amounts to in SGP moves.
Let’s now look at aptness.
3.5 Aptness
A SGP move is apt if and only if it is successful because competent. We already
have precise accounts of success and competence. What is still needed is an ac-
count of because condition on aptness.
I will follow Sosa [2015] in adopting a competence manifestation account of
this condition. That is to say, an SGP move is apt if and only if its success manifests
its competence. The success of an SGP move manifests its competence if and only
if the competent move is successful in the SI of the ability exercised. For instance,
a shot you take in ARCH is apt if and only if it is competent, i.e. produced by
the exercise of an ability to hit the target such that ARCH is in the range of this
ability, successful, i.e. the shot hits the target, and the ability’s SI are satisfied. If
the shot is not competent, unsuccessful, or the SI are not in place, it will fall short
of aptness.
I would thus like to suggest the following account of aptness:
SGP Aptness. A move in a given SGP is apt if and only if it is (i) successful, (ii)
competent and (iii) the SI of the ability exercised are satisfied.
Before moving on, I’d like to make one last point, which will be of some
importance in what follows. Note that aptness, competence and success can come
apart in various ways. In particular, a successful move in an SGP need not be
competent. And moves that are both successful and competent can still fall short of
aptness. Both of these point are nicely illustrated by the case of ARCH. Consider
a case in which you take a shot in ARCH. Suppose you are completely drunk
when taking the shot. As a result, your shot is not competent. But now suppose
that, by an incredible stroke of luck, your shot hits the target anyway. Your shot is
successful without being competent. Consider, next, a case in which, unbeknownst
to you, there is a magnet at the shooting range that brings any shot fired at it off
target. You take a competent shot at that shooting range which is brought off target
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by the magnet. Fortunately for you, a helper with a wind machine brings it back on
target with the result that shot is successful after all. Your move is both successful
and competent and yet falls short of aptness.
While it is true that there are SGPs such that aptness and success come apart
in this way, things are different for other SGPs. Consider the practice of joining
consenting adults in lawful marriage (henceforth LM). LM can be understood as
an SGP. Targets here are couples of consenting adults, moves are tokens of cer-
emonies of a certain type, call it c, and the designated relation is effecting the
lawful marriage of the couple. A success in LM is a token of c that effects the law-
ful marriage of the target couple. (The definitions of LM ability, exercise thereof,
competent move and apt move are as expected.)
Crucially, there is reason to believe that one joins partners in lawful marriage
only if one competently conducts a token of c. To see this, suppose you, the master
of ceremony, fail to competently conduct a token of c. This may be for two reasons.
You may fail to conduct a token of c altogether, say because you are too drunk and
so do not manage to say enough of the relevant words. Or else the SGP may not
be in the range of c, say because one of the partners is under age and so a different
kind of ceremony is needed. In either case, the couple will not end up lawfully
married. Since joining the couple in lawful marriage is the success condition of
LM, this means that the success of LM will not be attained. If so, there is reason
to believe that a move in LM will be successful only if competent.
What’s more, there is also reason to believe that one joins partners in lawful
marriage only if the SI of the ability exercised are satisfied. To see this, suppose
that the situational conditions are not satisfied. For instance, one key situational
condition for the ability to join partners in lawful marriage is that any caveat lodged
against the marriage has been discharged. So suppose that this SI is not in place.
There remains an undischarged caveat against the marriage. If so, again, the couple
will not end up lawfully married, even if you have competently conducted a token
of c. Since joining the couple in lawful marriage is the success condition of LM,
this means that the success of LM will not be attained. As a result, there is also
reason to believe that a move in LM will be successful only if the SI of the ability
exercised are satisfied.
These considerations motivate the following condition on success in LM:
LM Success. A move in LM is successful only if it is competent and the SI of the
ability exercised are satisfied.16
LM Success is an informative condition on success in LM. After all, it does not
hold for successes in other SGPs such as ARCH and so captures relevant informa-
tion about success in LM. At the same time, LM Success is unfit to constitute part
of a reductive analysis of success in LM/joining consenting couples in lawful mar-
riage. After all, it features the notion of competence, which, in turn, is unpacked
16 Other plausible candidates for types of performances such that success entails a competence-
in-SI condition are certain types of intentional action, such as winking, waving, applauding and
reading as well as Zagzebski’s [1996] acts of virtue.
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in terms of an ability to attain success in LM/join consenting couples in lawful
marriage.
Now, let ∆ be any SGP such that a move in ∆ is successful only if it is com-
petent and the SI of the ability exercised are satisfied. Since, trivially, a move in
∆ will be successful only if it is successful, it follows that a move in ∆ is success-
ful only if successful, competent and the SI of the ability exercised are satisfied.
However, by the relevant instance of SGP Aptness, we get the result that a move
in ∆ is successful if and only if apt. Since, by LM Success, LM is an SGP that
features the relevant condition on success, we get:
LM Aptness. A move in LM is successful if and only if it is apt.
It comes to light, then, that while there are SGPs in which aptness and success
come apart in the sense that one can attain success whilst falling short of aptness,
in others aptness not only entails success, but success also entails aptness.
4 Knowledge and Justified Belief
I will now apply this account of SGPs, SGP abilities, exercises thereof and com-
petent SGP moves to the epistemic case. To begin with, I would like to suggest
that a relevant fragment of epistemic activity—viz. inquiry into specific whether
questions (henceforth simply ‘inquiry’)—can be understood as an SGP. Or, to be
more precise, it can be understood as a collection of SGPs, one for each question.
More specifically, my suggestion is that the targets of inquiry are true answers.
For instance, the target of an inquiry into whether p is the true member of the set in-
cluding the proposition that p and the proposition that not-p. Moves in inquiry are
beliefs.17 For instance, believing p constitutes a move in an inquiry into whether
p, as does believing not-p. The designated relation in inquiry is the knowledge
relation.18,19 A success in inquiry, then, is a belief that qualifies as knowledge
(henceforth also ‘knowledgeable belief’ for short). In other words,
Successful Belief. A belief is successful if and only if it qualifies as knowledge.
17 A complete account would also countenance suspension of judgement as a type of move.
Notice, however, that suspension of judgement is a second-order attitude. Given my aim of pro-
viding an account of first-order knowledge and justified belief (fn.13), the issue of suspension of
judgement can safely be set aside.
18 Given that in inquiry targets are true answers and moves are beliefs, doesn’t this commit me
to saying that true beliefs constitute successes in inquiry? No. To see this, imagine a variation of
Eight-ball in which pockets must be designated and balls must be potted intentionally—flukes that
find the designated pocket via a set of cushions do not count. Here, there is a clear sense in which
the pocket is the target, but not any move that finds the pocket qualifies as a success.
19 I argue in some detail that knowledge rather than weaker epistemic standings (such as justified
and/or true belief) is the goal of inquiry into particular whether questions in [Kelp 2014c]. For an
argument that understanding why is not the goal of inquiry into such questions see [Kelp 2014b].
Compatibly with this, understanding may be the goal of inquiry into various phenomena and subject
matters. The reason for this is that understanding is a form of knowledge (see [Kelp 2015d] for an
argument).
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What’s more, we can apply the accounts of SGP abilities, their exercises, com-
petent belief and apt belief from the previous section to the epistemic case. This
gives us first the following accounts of abilities to know and their exercises:
Ability to Know. One has an ability to know propositions in a range, R, and
relative to conditions, C, if and only if one has a way of belief formation, W ,
such that, for any p ∈ R, using W in C disposes one to form knowledgeable
beliefs that p.
Exercises of Abilities to Know. One exercises an ability, A, to know propositions
in range R and relative to conditions C if and only if one has A and forms a
belief via the way of belief formation at issue in A.
Competent Belief. One competently believes that p if and only if one’s belief that
p is formed by an exercise of an ability to know propositions in range R and
relative to conditions C such that p ∈ R.
Apt Belief. A belief is apt if and only if it is (i) successful, (ii) competent and (iii)
the SI of the ability to know exercised are satisfied.
Recall that traditional virtue epistemology identifies justified belief and knowl-
edge with different normative standings of beliefs as performances. In particular,
they identify justified belief with competent belief and knowledge with apt belief.
I would like to follow traditional virtue epistemologists on this front. That is to
say, I would like to offer the following accounts of justified belief and knowledge:
KFVE-JB. One justifiably believes that p if and only if one competently believes
that p.
KFVE-K. One knows that p if and only if one aptly believes that p.
Let me say a few words to explain these accounts of justified belief and knowl-
edge. They are superficially indistinguishable from their traditionalist rivals. At
the same time, once they are properly unpacked, there are substantial differences
between the two.
Starting with KFVE-JB, notice that, on my account, competent belief is anal-
ysed in terms of abilities to know. In true knowledge first style, then, KFVE-JB
reverses the traditional direction of analysis and analyses justified belief in terms
of knowledge, where knowledge has explanatory priority over justified belief.
What’s more, whilst the accounts of abilities to know and their exercises do
not figure directly in KFVE-JB they are of crucial importance to it. After all, they
contribute to making the core notions in terms of which justified belief is defined
more precise.
Let’s move on to KFVE-K, then. First, it is of crucial importance to keep in
mind that, unlike its traditionalist cousin, KFVE-K does not (and actually could
not) offer a reductive analysis of knowledge. The easiest way to appreciate this
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point is by taking note of the fact that apt belief requires successful belief and
successful belief is knowledgeable belief. According to KFVE-K, then, one key
condition a belief must satisfy in order to qualify as knowledge is that it qualifies
as knowledge. KFVE-K is blatantly circular and thus unfit for the purposes of
reductive analysis.
Second, notice that it follows from Successful Belief and KFVE-K that a belief
is successful if and only if it is apt. After all, by Successful Belief, a belief is suc-
cessful if and only if it qualifies as knowledge and, by KFVE-K, a belief qualifies
as knowledge if and only if it is apt. It follows that a belief is successful if and
only if it is apt.
As we have seen in the previous section, in and of itself, this is no cause for
concern. There are other cases of SGPs in which a move in the relevant SGP is
successful if and only if apt. The practice of joining consenting adults in lawful
marriage (LM) is a case in point.
What’s more, on reflection, it is independently plausible that in the case of
inquiry, moves are successful if and only if apt. In fact, an argument parallel to the
one that made this point for LM will do the trick here too. Here goes.
To begin with, there is reason to believe that knowledge requires competent
belief. To see this, suppose you, an epistemic agent, form a belief that you are
facing a barn, say, that falls short of being competent. This may be for two reasons.
You may fail to exercise an ability to know, say because you form your belief on the
basis of a coin toss. Or else the proposition may not be in the range of your ability,
say because it has been produced by an ability to recognise colours. In either case,
you end up not knowing that you are facing a barn. Since knowledge is success
in inquiry, this means that success in inquiry will not be attained. If so, there is
reason to believe that a move in inquiry will be successful only if competent.
What’s more, there is also reason to believe that knowledge requires that the
SI of the ability exercised are satisfied. To see this, suppose that the situational
conditions are not satisfied: you are in fake barn county, are currently looking at
a fake barn etc. If so, again, you end up not knowing that you are facing a barn.
Since knowledge is the success condition of inquiry, this means that success in
inquiry will not be attained. As a result, there is also reason to believe that a move
in inquiry will be successful only if the SI of the ability exercised are satisfied.
Just as in the case of LM before, these considerations motivate the following
condition on success in inquiry:
Inquiry Success. One’s move in inquiry is successful only if it is competent and
the SI of ability exercised are satisfied.
But now recall that we saw in the last section that, for any SGP such that this
condition holds, it follows that a move in that SGP is successful if and only if apt.
Since we have seen that there is independent reason to think that Inquiry Success
is true, this means that it is independently plausible that a belief is successful if
and only if it is apt.
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Finally, it may be worth noting that, just as in the case of LM Success, Inquiry
Success is an informative condition on success in inquiry and yet is not suited
to constitute part of a reductive analysis of success in inquiry/knowledge. It is
informative because the parallel condition does not hold for successes in other
SGPs such as ARCH and so captures relevant information about success in inquiry.
It is unfit to constitute part of a reductive analysis of success in inquiry/knowledge
because it features the notion of competence, which, in turn, is unpacked in terms
of an ability to attain success in inquiry/knowledge.
5 The Gettier Problem
With KFVE in play, I would now like to take a closer look at how the view deals
with the Gettier problem. One might think that once the traditional analytical
project is abandoned in favour of a knowledge first approach to epistemology, the
Gettier problem does not arise in the first place. While this is true in a sense, there
is a variation of the problem that arises for knowledge first epistemology. To see
this, let’s have another look at our two Gettier cases:
Stopped Clock. Having come down the stairs, Mr. White looks at the grandfather clock
in the hallway, sees that it reads 8:22 and on that basis comes to believe that it is
8:22. The clock has an outstanding track-record of functioning properly and Mr.
White has no reason to think that it is currently not accurate. His belief is true. It
is in fact 8:22. Unbeknownst to Mr. White, however, the clock has stopped exactly
twelve hours ago.
Fake Barns. Mr. Pink is driving through the countryside and is looking out of the window
of his car. He sees what appears to be a barn in the field and forms a perceptual
belief that there is a barn in the field. Unbeknownst to Mr. Pink, he is looking at
one of the few real barns in an area peppered with barn façades that are so cleverly
constructed as to be indistinguishable from real barns from Mr. Pink’s position on
the road.
Recall that, intuitively, Mr. White’s and Mr. Pink’s beliefs do not qualify as knowl-
edge. Crucially, it is intuitively equally plausible that their beliefs are justified.
Knowledge first epistemological accounts of justified belief will have to accom-
modate the intuition that beliefs of agents in Gettier cases are justified. While
the original version of the Gettier problem does not arise within knowledge first
epistemology, a variation of it does.
What’s more, even though knowledge first epistemological accounts do not of-
fer a reductive analysis of knowledge, they may offer informative necessary condi-
tions on knowledge. If so, the question remains whether the necessary conditions
countenanced are satisfied in Gettier cases. If not, knowledge first accounts may
even be able to predict the absence of knowledge here.
In what follows, I will look at how KFVE deals with each kind of Gettier case.
In particular, I will argue that KFVE successfully predicts both the presence of
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justification and the absence of knowledge in both kinds of case. I will start once
more with standard Gettier cases.
5.1 Standard Gettier Cases
First, in Stopped Clock, Mr. White’s belief that it is 8:22 is intuitively justified.
Can KFVE accommodate this intuition? To answer this question, notice first that
Mr. White acquires his belief that it is 8:22 in a way that qualifies as an ability
to know propositions about the time. After all, forming his belief via this way
disposes Mr. White to acquire knowledgeable beliefs about the time across a range
of conditions. For instance, it does so in cases just like Stopped Clock with the
exception that the clock he is taking a reading from is functioning properly. Given
that Mr. White acquires his belief that it is 8:22 in a way that qualifies as an ability
to know propositions about the time, his belief is the product of an exercise of an
ability to know propositions about the time. Since the belief Mr. White forms is
a belief about the time, the target proposition is within the range of the ability to
know that produced his belief. By Competent Belief, Mr. White’s belief that it is
8:22 is competent and, by KFVE-JB, justified.20
Second, Mr. White’s belief intuitively falls short of knowledge. Recall that
KFVE does provide an informative virtue condition on knowledge. As a result,
we may ask whether this condition is satisfied here. If it isn’t, then KFVE has the
additional benefit of being able to explain the intuition of absence of knowledge,
besides the intuition of presence of justified belief in this kind of case.
Let’s return to Stopped Clock once more, then. Notice that the clock Mr. White
is taking a reading from is stopped. As a result, he is not in conditions C relative to
which he has the ability to acquire knowledge about the time. After all, Mr. White’s
way of belief formation does not dispose him to form knowledgeable beliefs about
the time in conditions in which the clock he is taking a reading from is stopped.
At the same time, the conditions Mr. White finds himself in do not prevent him
from forming his belief via the way that constitutes an ability to know relative to
some (but different) conditions. This means that Mr. White is in unsuitable SI for
his ability to acquire knowledge about the time. By Apt Belief, his belief that it is
8:22 is not apt and, by KFVE-K, it falls short of knowledge. In this way, KFVE
predicts not only presence of justified belief, but also the absence of knowledge in
Stopped Clock. There is thus reason to believe that KFVE can successfully handle
standard Gettier cases.
20 It may be worth noting that, as a result, KFVE can also allow for justified false beliefs. If this
isn’t immediately obvious, consider a variation of Stopped Clock in which Mr. White acquires his
belief about the time a minute earlier or later. In that case, his belief that it is 8:22 will be false. At
the same time, according to KFVE-JB it will still be justified. In fact, as I argue elsewhere [Kelp
2015b] in more detail the virtue epistemology at issue in KFVE can solve or defuse a number of
long-standing problems for broadly reliabilist accounts of justified belief, including the new evil
demon problem, the problem of clairvoyance cases and the generality problem.
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5.2 Fake Barn Cases
Arguably, standard Gettier cases have never posed much of a difficulty for VE.
The hard nut to crack are fake barn cases. Let’s return to Fake Barns then. Here,
too, Mr. Pink’s belief that he is facing a barn is intuitively justified but falls short
of knowledge. Fortunately, it is easy enough to see that KFVE can explain the
presence of justified belief and the absence of knowledge here in much the same
way as in standard Gettier cases.
First, concerning the presence of justified belief, the way in which Mr. Pink
forms his belief qualifies as an ability to recognise barns, for the same reasons as
Mr. White’s way of belief formation in Stopped Clock qualifies as an ability to
know propositions about the time. If so, Mr. Pink’s belief that he is facing a barn
is the product of an exercise of an ability to recognise barns. Since the belief Mr.
Pink forms is a belief about the presence of a barn, the target proposition is within
the range of the ability to know that produced his belief. By Competent Belief, Mr.
Pink’s belief that he is facing a barn is competent and, by KFVE-JB, justified.
Second, concerning the absence of knowledge, the fact that Mr. Pink is in a part
of the country in which fake barns predominate means that he is not in conditions
C relative to which he has the ability to recognise barns. At the same time, the
conditions Mr. Pink finds himself in do not prevent him from forming his belief
via the way that constitutes an ability to know relative to some (but different)
conditions. This means that Mr. Pink is in unsuitable SI for his ability to recognise
barns. By Apt Belief, Mr. Pink’s belief that he is facing a barn is not apt. By
KFVE-K, it falls short of knowledge.
Of course, the real problem that fake barn cases pose for VE is not just to ac-
commodate the intuition of absence of knowledge in fake barn cases. Traditional
versions of VE can achieve this much. Rather, the challenge is to offer a satis-
factory account of fake barn cases, without at the same time ending up making
incorrect predictions in Frankfurt cases. Let’s see whether KFVE can rise to this
challenge as well.
Recall our toy Frankfurt case:
Frankfurt Clock. Mr. Blue’s arch-nemesis, a powerful demon, has an interest that Mr.
Blue forms a belief that it’s 8:22 by looking at the grandfather clock in the hallway
when he comes down the stairs. In order to achieve this, Mr. Blue’s arch-nemesis is
prepared to set the clock to 8:22 when Mr. Blue comes down the stairs. However,
Mr. Blue’s arch-nemesis is also lazy. He will act only if Mr. Blue does not come
down the stairs at 8:22 of his own accord. Suppose, as it so happens, Mr. Blue does
come down the stairs at 8:22. Mr. Blue’s arch-nemesis remains inactive. Mr. Blue
forms a belief that it’s 8:22. It is 8:22. The grandfather clock is working reliably as
always.
Intuitively, Mr. Blue knows that it is 8:22. What does KFVE predict about this
case? And does KFVE’s treatment of Fake Barns entail that Mr. Blue does not
know that it’s 8:22? Let’s start with the second question. Fortunately, the answer
here is no. In a nutshell, the reason for this is that KFVE does not offer a reductive
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analysis of knowledge and hence is free to treat the difference between Fake Barns
and Frankfurt Clock as a fundamentally epistemic difference, that is, roughly, a
difference in knowledge. More specifically, while both Mr. Pink and Mr. Blue
form competent beliefs, only Mr. Blue is in suitable SI for the ability to know
he exercises and so satisfies KFVE’s necessary condition on knowledge. Why
is that? The answer is that only Mr. Blue is in SI such that his way of belief
formation disposes him to form the relevant knowledgeable beliefs. In this way,
KFVE can make a difference between Mr. Pink and Mr. Blue, albeit one that is
fundamentally epistemic. As a result, KFVE’s treatment of Fake Barns does not
lead to a corresponding incorrect prediction in Frankfurt Clock.21
This leaves the question as to what KFVE predicts about Frankfurt Clock: pres-
ence or absence of knowledge? The answer to this question is neither. After all,
KFVE does not offer a sufficient condition for knowledge. What’s more, it is in the
spirit of knowledge first epistemology to consider knowledge as basic in the sense
that we need not seek to offer an account of knowledge that explains the presence
of knowledge in particular cases. But then we need not expect KFVE to make
predictions about the presence of knowledge in Frankfurt Clock to begin with. Be
that as it may, the important point for present purposes is that KFVE’s treatment
of fake barn cases does not lead the view into trouble with Frankfurt cases.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed a novel virtue epistemological account of knowl-
edge and justified belief, one that gives VE a knowledge-first twist. In order to
achieve this, I first outlined a framework for simple goal-directed practices, i.e.
practices that can be characterised in terms of targets, moves and a designated re-
lation, and defined the notions of ability, exercise of ability, competent and apt
moves for such practices. I then suggested that inquiry into whether questions can
be viewed as a collection of simple goal-direct practices in which targets are true
answers, moves are beliefs and the designated relation is the knowledge relation.
I derived the corresponding accounts of abilities to know, their exercises, compe-
tent and apt belief. With these accounts in play, I went on to embrace the familiar
virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge as apt belief and justified belief as
competent belief. The crucial difference between my account and its traditionalist
21 Note that while KFVE can allow that Mr. Blue knows while Mr. Pink doesn’t, it is not com-
mitted to these verdicts. For instance, KFVE can also accommodate the intuitions of those who
think that Mr. Pink knows, viz. by allowing that the SI in Fake Barns are suitable (as Mr. Pink’s
way of belief formation does dispose him to form the relevant knowledgeable beliefs in those SI).
Similarly, KFVE can accommodate the intuitions of who think that Mr. Blue doesn’t know, viz. by
allowing that the SI in Frankfurt Clock are unsuitable (as Mr. Blue’s way of belief formation does
not dispose him to form the relevant knowledgeable beliefs in those SI). Of course, if either one of
these intuitions turns out correct, my argument from Frankfurt cases will not serve to establish an
advantage for KFVE over traditional VE after all. For what it’s worth, however, my own intuitions
are that Mr. Blue knows, whereas Mr. Pink doesn’t, which is why I think the argument does go
through.
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cousins is that abilities are unpacked as abilities to know. In this way, the account
qualifies as a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology. Finally, I showed that
KFVE has an edge over its traditionalist cousins. Not only can it handle fake barn
cases without further difficulty, it can also offer a uniform account of all Gettier
cases, including the fake barn and the standard variety. In view of all this, I submit,
knowledge first virtue epistemology is a promising view that deserves to be taken
seriously.22
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